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Abstract
Educational systems around the world have undergone major reforms since the 1980s, with 
largely disappointing results. The objective of this paper is to understand the reasons behind 
the lackluster results with the purpose of devising ways to address them. Analysis in the paper 
is based on the understanding that the education sector is characterized by distinct functional 
imperatives that need to be addressed in policy responses that must involve a wide array of 
actors to be effective.  In this view, education policy is fundamentally about establishing a gov-
ernance structure to ensure that all the essential functions necessary to achieve the chosen 
policy goals are performed. Accordingly, the paper proposes a governance framework for educa-
tion comprising political and operational functions, which it then applies to education policy 
reforms in the Philippines since the 1970s. The analysis finds that the reforms have focused on 
financing and decentralization issues while overlooking many other critical governance func-
tions. The lackluster results are unsurprising given that the sector has been beset by many 
problems unrelated to centralized bureaucratic administration and which have been left un-
attended. The conclusions regarding the importance of comprehensive governance to emerge 
from this study are relevant not only for understanding education policy reforms in the Philip-
pines and elsewhere but will also help develop a fuller understanding of the functioning of the 
education sector in general.
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Introduction
Educational systems around the world have undergone major transformations since the 1980s, 
largely due to the growing recognition of the central role they play as a driver of economic and 
social development. In developing countries, the Millennium Development Goals, and its suc-
cessor the Sustainable Development Goals, have played a catalytic role in pushing education 
reform to the center of development debates. However, most countries have been more suc-
cessful at quantitative expansion of school places and attendance rather than providing quality 
education. We can look back to the experience of these countries to draw lessons from their 
experiences, especially regarding their efforts to implement the policy of universal education. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze education policy reforms in the Philippines in recent 
decades, with the purpose of drawing generalizable conclusions about what works, in what 
combination, and to what extent. It starts by drawing attention to the critical failures that af-
flict the education sector and then proposing a framework for addressing them. It argues that 
the purpose of education policy must be to develop a governance framework to ensure that all 
necessary functions to achieve desired goals are performed. It then applies the framework to 
the case of education policy reforms in the Philippines. The study finds that the reforms have 
focused largely on mobilizing additional resources and decentralizing management. While the 
measures did address some critical governance imperatives, they overlooked many governance 
arrangements necessary for the reforms to succeed. Given the critical governance deficiencies 
that remain unattended, Philippine’s mediocre educational performance is hardly surprising.
Education Reform
Education systems are one of the most complex systems of organization in the public sector, 
making reforms and innovations particularly complicated. The very nature of the sector – the 
variety of stakeholders, differences in time horizons, and unpredictability and immeasurabil-
ity of results – sets it apart from other services (Cerna, 2014). Education bureaucracies are 
typically seen as difficult to reform because they are “multitask, multi-principal, multi-period, 
near-monopoly organization[s] with vague and poorly observable goals” (Dixit, 2002, p. 719). 
Observers have long characterized education systems as ‘loosely coupled systems’ or ‘organ-
ized anarchies’ (Weick, 1976), where “authority and power are distributed among well-defined 
institutions at different levels” (Kogan, 1975, p. 231). Such weakly but interdependent connec-
tions between units are typically seen as caused by unclear means-end connection and frag-
mented internal and external environments (Orton & Weick, 1990), not by conscious strategy 
but as a product of adaptation to the varying pressures on the organization manifested as 
‘organizational foolishness’ (March, 1981). These characteristics of education systems, includ-
ing the inherent path dependency associated with its socio-political value in nation-building 
(Szolár, 2015; Tan & Yang, 2019) and interdependence with other components of the social 
system (Paterson & Iannelli, 2007), make education reforms particularly hard to pull off. 
Policymakers have nonetheless embarked on education policy reforms that either reallocate 
existing spending to more productive areas of education, introduced financing schemes to 
fill gaps, and/or re-configured managerial and institutional arrangements (Tiongson, 2005). 
These reforms are distinct from the typical curricular reforms or professional development 
interventions pervasive in the sector because they affect the distributional impact of educa-
tion by shaping how education services are delivered rather than what is delivered (Egalite, 
Fusarelli, & Fusarelli, 2017; Wong, 1994). The types of education reform also vary by the meas-
ures implemented: rules, resources and incentives (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Rules and 
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mandates are important in establishing the scope of authority of central administration and 
their span of control in ensuring that all units adhere to similar standards. It is believed that 
resource constraints inhibit the ability of education professionals to deliver educational ser-
vices, supported by adequate classrooms, qualified teachers, and sufficient textbooks that are 
conducive to learning. Incentives are also equally crucial as studies show policy measures like 
cash and  transfer programs influence household behavior by keeping children in school who 
would otherwise engage in child labor  (Baird, Ferreira, Özler, & Woolcock, 2014).
The wide range of actors involved in education, depicted in Figure 1, complicates efforts to 
reform it. Education, after all, “is produced by business enterprise and by households, as well 
as by government; it is partly produced outside the market altogether” (Rivlin, 1973, p. 413). 
Governments have attempted to generate information about the actual production process 
of education services, the characteristics of the product in so far as how learning occurs, and 
the behavior of different actors involved in the delivery of education (Hannaway & Woodroffe, 
2003). As shown in Figure 1, schools lie at the heart of education service delivery and many 
countries employ a private-public mix school system. Their relations with the government and 
households differ depending on school ownership. The government sets standards and regula-
tions for all schools but provides different levels and forms of funding for public and private 
schools. Households are co-producers of education and pursue their interests by exercising 
choice between private and public schools. They also make the government accountable, pri-
marily through elections but also increasingly through school management bodies of various 
sorts.
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Intervening in such a complex policy sector makes for an uncertain policy environment and 
only limited scope for complete success. Thus,  even reforms successful at improving enrol-
ment, attendance and progression do not necessarily lead to improvement in test scores and 
achievement outcomes (Petrosino, Morgan, Fronius, Tanner-Smith, & Boruch, 2012). Simi-
larly, decentralization efforts like school-based management (SBM)have been shown to reduce 
repetition rates and student failures, but evidence is mixed regarding their effects on academic 
achievement (Patrinos & Fasih, 2009). Pious hopes aside, there is no reason to assume that 
schools will perform the required functions simply because they have been conferred decision 
authority, as assumed by proponents of decentralization. As Chapman puts it, “[d]ecentraliza-
tion is not an automatic solution unless decision making reflects a clearly defined division of 
authority and responsibility between different levels of the system” (Chapman, 2000, p. 302). 
The school management needs to be given clear direction, backed by appropriate incentives 
and rewards, if they are to achieve their objective.
What is needed, first of all, is a coherent conceptualization of a comprehensive governance frame-
work for education. Many scholars have rightly called for bringing together the theories of pub-
lic policy with education policy to fully understand and address the challenges faced by the 
sector (Grace, 1995; Whitty, 2002). Yet, there is little theoretical work offering systematic defi-
nition of education policy or education system reforms. Education system is often understood 
to mean anything that pertains to the design and implementation of education – laws, rules, 
administrative offices, personnel, and instructional materials. In this view, educational policy 
refers to any intervention that affects the education system, with the notion of ‘policy’ bor-
rowed from policy studies without due understanding of its purpose (Corson, 1986; Ranson, 
1995). These wide-spanning and catch-all conceptualizations have spurred limited theoreti-
cal debates about how best education systems should be configured or how education policies 
should be designed. 
Traditionally, educational policy interventions were designed to shape how learning occurred 
in the classroom and often ignored the policy and implementation aspects of education. Early 
reforms in the US, for example, were inspired by perceptions of a ‘crisis of teaching’ despite the 
absence of strong empirical evidence supporting this perception (Weis, 1987). Education policy 
is not only about “the statements of strategic, organizational and operational values (product) 
but also the capacity to operationalize values (process)” (Bell & Stevenson, 2006, p. 18). Thus, 
from a policy perspective, education reforms can be conceived as the changes in objectives and 
organization of the education system as well as the capacity to carry out the intended changes 
(Bowe, Ball, & Gold, 2017). Since education is inherently multi-dimensional, multi-objective 
and multi-principal, policy reforms are unavoidably intertwined, with goals and implementa-
tion strategies typically layered and woven together (Helgøy & Homme, 2006). This points to 
the importance of analyzing the elements of education reform as a whole rather than as dis-
crete strategies or measures.  Education reforms are also necessarily political, as they produce 
winners and losers (Levin, 2001).
From this perspective, education policy is fundamentally about establishing a governance structure 
to ensure that all the essential functions necessary to achieve the chosen policy goals are performed. 
This is aligned with the ‘governance turn’ in education, where transformation in systems in-
volves changes in structures, participants, discourse and ‘subjects’ (Ball, 2009). However, while 
actors play a huge role in governance, as suggested by existing notions of decentered govern-
ance (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 2006) or interpretivist governance (Rhodes, 2012), the choice of 
the structural relationship between the government and non-government actors – as in legal, 
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market, network or corporatized – is an important determinant of governance effectiveness 
(Capano, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2015). Effective governance of education can be designed by ex-
amining how these actors can meaningfully work together to address key governance failures 
(Saguin, 2019). Education reforms thus involve effecting changes to the governance functions, 
including funding, provision, ownership and regulation (Dale, 1997).  Using Kooiman’s (2000) 
framework of distinguishing socio-political interactions based on ‘governing orders’, education 
reforms inevitably alter the management of day-to-day affairs (operational functions) as well 
as meta-governance (political) framework for how ‘governors are governed’.
Framework for Understanding Education Reforms
While the goals of education are diverse and controversial, the goals of education policy are, 
at the core, more straightforward, centered on establishing governance processes to guide the 
key stakeholders’ behavior in a desired manner. Effectively designing education policy involves 
identifying the necessary governance functions – which may be grouped as political and opera-
tional – that must be performed and establishing institutions and processes to ensure they are 
performed. The specific functions and mechanisms vary across jurisdictions and over time, of 
course, but they share substantive core conditions. A generic framework, which will be applied 
subsequently to the case of the Philippines, is outlined in Table 1.
Table 1. Critical Governance Functions in Education 
Political Operational
•	 Setting direction, goals and objectives •	 Designing and deploying 
appropriate policy tools
•	 Mobilizing resources for achieving goals •	 Managing financial and 
human resources 
•	 Building political support and establishing 
collaborative arrangements
•	 Ensuring accountability
•	 Allocating powers and responsibilities to ap-
propriate units and levels of the government
•	 Designing appropriate curriculum
Source: The Authors
A crucial political policy function in education, indeed any sector, is to set the overall strategic 
direction and goals and the medium- to short-term objectives: what is it that the government 
seeks to achieve through its policy measures and within what time frame? Is it to provide es-
sential education to all, reduce regional or socio-economic disparities, or train a work-ready 
workforce, and so on? While these are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals, not all can be 
pursued simultaneously, at least not easily and not in the medium to short term due to practi-
cal difficulties (Mintrom, 2001). Next, it is important for governments to mobilize the fiscal 
and political resources necessary to support the measures being taken to achieve the goals. 
While providing basic education to all children is within the fiscal means of most governments, 
higher quality education requires better facilities and better paid teachers, which requires ad-
ditional resources that often must come at the expense of other sectors. Without belabor-
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ing the definition of quality, which has been debated and discussed elsewhere (Cheng & Tam, 
1997; Harvey & Green, 1993; Hoy, Bayne-Jardine, & Wood, 2000), the term is taken here to 
mean the development of a range of  socioemotional, technical, and physical skills that allow 
individuals to be productive and innovative (World Bank, 2018). Similarly, objectives such as 
promoting equity or national integration require political will and capacity to counter likely op-
position from groups who do not benefit and may even lose out. Finally, governments need to 
strengthen their links with societal partners and enjoy their trust and support to push through 
politically difficult measures (Zajda, 2003). Many reform efforts around the world flounder in 
the face of opposition from teachers’ unions and apathy from the population (Strunk & Gris-
som, 2010). Successful reforms also need the support of business, who can contribute finances 
as well as labor market information for education. As such, political alliances between the gov-
ernment and civil society are essential for effective education policy reform.
Ensuring that the right levels of government are tasked with the appropriate responsibilities is 
a vital governance function (King & Guerra, 2005). Strategic direction and goals, for instance, 
must necessarily come from the highest level of the government, while local governments and 
service delivery units (i.e. Schools) must set their own operational objectives aligned with over-
all goals. The overall responsibility for mobilizing fiscal and political resources is similarly the 
responsibility of the central government, even in situations when education spending is the 
responsibility of local governments. Without such an arrangement, local governments with 
weak finances, tenuous political support, or low policy capacity will be left behind. Education, 
similar to other complex sectors, requires a modicum of collaboration across agencies and with 
partners that is best undertaken at the local level, whereby families, businesses, and teachers 
collaborate to achieve goals and objectives (Han & Ye, 2017).
Most operational functions – policy tools, accountability mechanisms, and fiscal and personnel 
systems – are the responsibility of regional governments, though central and local govern-
ments are intricately involved. As such, the regional governments need to be given the respon-
sibility and commensurate financial and other resources to perform the actions.
The overwhelming emphasis on across-the-board decentralization in education reforms in 
many countries has skewed reform efforts and produced unsatisfactory results.  Even a de-
centralized system requires the national government to ‘steer’ the education sector not only 
through the traditional mechanisms of curriculum, operating procedures, and accountability 
requirements, but also through performance monitoring and evaluation (Daun, 2007; Karlsen, 
2000). Bardhan (2002) rightfully argued for the national government to take on ‘activist roles’ 
such as mobilizing citizens and providing technical assistance and coordination of localities to 
mitigate the negative outcomes from decentralization. A strong measure of central direction 
is also necessary to mitigate regional disparities and prevent rent-seeking behavior by local 
governments (Ozga, 2009). However, performing these activities requires a certain ability to 
acquire and process information and data to understand where interventions are necessary 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Ouimet et al., 2010). 
The intermediate level of government is expected to localize national priorities and direction 
based on the local setting through consultations and bargaining with other actors such as lo-
cal politicians and local counterparts of national government agencies. Establishment of field 
administration is especially critical where tasks and responsibilities are geographically dis-
tributed through deconcentration (Fesler, 1968; Rondinelli, 1981). Those at the intermediate 
level are typically expected to carry out inspection and monitoring as well as offer pedagogical 
support, technical advice, capacity building of local staff, and performance evaluation (Daun, 
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2007). As an intermediator, units at this level of administration require high levels of analyti-
cal capacity to localize policies and standards but only require moderate levels of managerial 
capacity since intermediate levels are responsible for budgeting but are not delivery units. They 
should also have medium level of political capacity because of the need to create vertical inte-
gration of programs with both the national and local levels and horizontal coordination with 
other agencies and regional politicians. 
Once the government has set the political direction and mobilized resources and built support 
for the reform measures, it needs to put them in operation, which comprises numerous inter-
related and intertwined tasks. Significant failures to perform these tasks will trip the reforms 
and, indeed, it is through failure in this area that reforms often go awry. 
The first task is to plan the delivery of the new programs and adjust the existing program as 
necessary. In education, in addition to curriculum issues, there is the vital task of designing 
the organizational structures and their roles, powers and responsibilities (Altrichter, Hein-
rich, & Soukup-Altrichter, 2014). This is perhaps the most important operational task because 
assigning tasks to wrong agencies or insufficiently clarifying the relationships among them 
would stymie concerted action. It is in this broader institutional context that SBM needs to 
be conceptualized, and not as a separate reform, as is commonly the case. Another critical op-
erational task is to design necessary rules, regulations, and standards to control agencies’ and 
their officials’ behavior, accompanied by appropriate incentives and disincentives to reward 
and improve performance (Hannaway & Woodroffe, 2003). Similarly, the concerned agencies 
need to be allocated the financial and personnel resources necessary to acquit themselves of 
their responsibilities backed by a robust budgeting and personnel system. Finally, it is critical 
to establish robust accountability mechanisms for monitoring, reviewing and auditing perfor-
mance, and meting out rewards and penalties as appropriate. All of the other efforts may come 
to naught if agencies and their officials realize that there are no penalties for poor performance 
and no rewards for exceeding expectations. 
Designing and operating a modern education system is a complex task and involves immense 
challenges, the overcoming of which requires sophisticated analytical work on the part of poli-
cymakers. Designing an appropriate curriculum so that children receive the intended educa-
tion, for example, requires analyzing vast data and drawing policy-relevant conclusions about 
them. Effective education policy also requires data and analysis of trends regarding educational 
achievements, equity, productivity, human resource needs and so on, all of which require elabo-
rate and complex analytical tasks. The vital and growing importance of analytical skills and 
resources is yet to be fully understood and addressed in most governments.
Research Method
Using a single-case study method (Yin, 1981), this paper examines education policy reforms 
in the Philippines using the framework set out above. Based on archival data and expert inter-
views, observations are constructed diachronically as a way to tease out within-case variation 
that may have led to the existing set of education outcomes in the country (Gerring, 2006).  In 
June 2016, a total of seven (7) elite interviews were conducted with executives of the Depart-
ment of Education (DepEd) in the central, regional and district offices as well as at a school. 
The respondents were identified by DepEd based on who can provide the most relevant infor-
mation about how governance reforms are undertaken in the Department. As the research 
was largely exploratory, the purpose of the data collection was to help construct an “analyti-
cally generalizable” (Yin, 2009) framework to guide future governance reforms in education by 
other governments. 
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Education Policy Reforms in the Philippines
The Philippines represents a critical case for testing the comprehensive governance framework. 
Largely understudied in the education literature, the Philippines was an early leader in expand-
ing school education in Asia and indeed the developing world, but it lost the lead during the 
1970s and 1980s when social development stagnated along with economic growth and politi-
cal competition. At the turn of the 20th century, the Philippines sought to establish universal 
primary education and by the 1960s was “already ahead of most other colonies in popular 
education” (Myrdal, 1968, p. 1632). The end of dictatorship and the onset of democracy in the 
late 1980s fostered pressure for improving the quality of education for all children. The govern-
ment responded with broad sets of measures, including decentralization of education adminis-
tration (De Guzman, 2007), over successive periods, with mixed results. The country managed 
to pass key legislation to universalize kindergartens, extend the basic education cycle from 10 
to 12 years, and institutionalize mother-tongue based learning. Yet the quality of education 
remained and remains a concerns, confirmed by the recent OECD-PISA results, which put the 
country among the lowest of all those covered by the assessment  (Schleicher, 2019). 
Philippine government leaders have over the decades declared education to be one of their top 
policy priorities and devoted considerable resources to the sector. However, beyond expressing 
general commitment to promoting education, the government has offered little clarity about 
its goals or the means to achieve them. Instead of viewing the sector holistically and addressing 
the need to perform the diverse governance tasks that must be performed in concert, it has 
employed decentralization as a multi-purpose and omnipotent tool for achieving its disparate 
objectives despite pervasive evidence of this approach’s limitations. The singular emphasis on 
decentralization and neglect of other necessary reforms lie at the root of poor education out-
comes in the Philippines, as we will see in this section.
Table 2. Education Indicators, Philippines (1975-2015) 
Key Indicators 1975 1995 2015
•	 Net Enrolment Ratio (Primary) 96.79 (1976) 95.68 (1996) 95.72
•	 Gross Intake Ratio to the last 
grade of primary education
85.81 (1981) 84.70 (1998) 100.52
•	 Net Enrolment Ratio (Secondary) 46.19 (1979) 57.93 (1996) 65.92
•	 Gross Intake Ratio to the last 
grade of secondary education
68.40 (1992) 71.27 (2013)
•	 Govt Expenditure on 
Education, % of GDP
1.71 (1980) 3.04 2.7
Source: The Authors
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Setting Goals, Directions and Objectives 
Universal quality education has been the stated goal of successive governments in the Philip-
pines for decades, long before it was enshrined in the constitution in 1987. Yet no government 
has clearly spelled out a practical vision of how the goal is to be achieved. In fact, the problem 
of a lack of operational and achievable objectives was recognized as early as the 1970s: “The 
present objectives prescribed for Philippine education which are really goals of the entire social 
system, and are, therefore, unachievable aims for the educational system alone” (Presidential 
Commission to Survey Philippine Education, 1970, p. 2).
Efforts to clarify basic education policy objectives have proven insufficient despite identifica-
tion of clearer operational strategies. Defined in the K-12 law of 2012, education policy now 
seeks to develop a “productive and responsible [citizen] equipped with the essential competen-
cies, skills and values for both life-long learning and employment”. However, the basic educa-
tion bureaucracy sets itself up to fail when the policy objective reflects the goals of the entire 
education system (to include vocational and higher education), that is, to bestow functional 
literacy. Since performance of the basic education sector is typically measured in terms of ef-
ficiency (e.g. completion rates) and quality (e.g. achievement rates), what appears to be a more 
instructive of the problems (i.e. access and quality) basic education policy aims to address are 
the ones outlined by DepEd’s organizational outcomes: a) Access of every Filipino to a complete 
quality basic education achieved, and b) Preparedness of every graduate for further education 
and world of work ensured.
Building Political Support and Collaborative Arrangements
Like their East Asian neighbors, Filipinos value education primarily because of the belief that 
it is the main determinant of better employment and income prospects. Based on the Nielsen 
Global Survey of Education Aspirations in 2013, 90% of Filipinos correlate quality of education 
with better opportunities in the workplace, compared to a global average of 75%. In 2016, So-
cial Weather Station (SWS) also found strong support from the public for providing more funds 
for education. It is therefore unsurprising that education policies feature prominently among 
legislators’ political agenda, with 44% of the bills filed on the 16th Congress in the House of 
Representatives coming from the Committee on Basic Education and Culture. 
The breadth of support for education has made it easy to mobilize stakeholders to contribute 
to the attainment of stated goals. The K-12 reform that began in 2010 was necessitated by 
the need for a calibrated effort on the part of the three education agencies – DepEd, Commis-
sion on Higher Education (CHED) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority 
(TESDA) – to lead a multi-sectoral advisory group. Curriculum reform required collaboration 
between the CHED and TESDA to determine what competencies are articulated in basic educa-
tion from university and vocational education. Identifying competencies needed by industry 
necessitated working with the labor department and various industry organizations. The ac-
tual extension of the education cycle also meant that colleges and universities would almost 
have zero enrolment for two full years, but associations of private universities remained largely 
supportive of the initiative. All these arrangements required a macro-level view of how reforms 
unravel and how stakeholders can be engaged to push it forward. 
But such ease in building support is only contingent on the ability of the education bureau-
cracy to coordinate the introduction of reforms. The typical mandated nature of coordination 
between the different education agencies indicates an environment deficient of regular har-
monization of policies and programs. As a result of education tri-focalization, setting up the 
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sub-sector education goals required mobilizing different stakeholders at different levels of the 
government, prompting various administrations to create special coordinative bodies to ‘har-
monize [the] goals and objectives’ of the education system, such as Joseph Estrada’s Presiden-
tial Commission on Educational Reform and Gloria Arroyo’s National Coordinating Council for 
Education (NCCE). Such ad hoc and sporadic efforts undermined the government’s capacity to 
implement reforms in a coordinated manner. 
Mobilizing Resources
Early on, the political leaders realized that education objectives can only be achieved with am-
ple supply of fiscal resources. A provision in the 1987 Constitution mandated the government 
to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education” to guarantee the right to quality educa-
tion of all citizens at all levels. The provision addresses low spending on education. The share of 
education spending in total national spending declined from 31.53% in 1957 to 7.61% in 1981, 
before rising again to 16% in 1987 (Dolan, 1993). More recently, education spending stayed 
within the range of 13%-18% of the total budget from 2009-2017. 
Historically, financing education has posed a major challenge to enacting reforms. Because of 
unstable national budgeting processes, local governments have been mobilized as supplemen-
tary financing for construction and operations of schools since the early 1960s. In 1991, local 
governments were required to allocate 1% of the real property tax revenues to a Special Educa-
tion Fund (SEF). This boosted local government spending on education from P0.8 billion in 
1991 to P7.9 billion in 1998 (Behrman, Deolalikar, & Soon, 2002).  By 2008, SEF expenditure 
as a percentage of non-personnel expenditure on education was 41% (Manasan, Cuenca, & 
Celestino, 2011), suggesting a significantly larger contribution of local governments on educa-
tion than originally conceived.
Despite this, additional financing was needed to fill in the input gaps, particularly classrooms. 
Since 2012, the private sector, through public-private partnerships (PPP), has constructed 
more than 10,000 classrooms, amounting to a monetary value of Php19 billion. International 
financing institutions also provided loans, such as one of approximately $300 million from the 
Asian Development Bank in 2011. 
Allocating Powers and Responsibilities to Appropriate Levels of Government 
The history of administrative decentralization of education in the Philippines clearly highlights 
how decisions about organizational forms, despite good intentions, are often misguided. Allo-
cating powers and responsibilities to different units and levels of government revolved around 
expanding the scope and depth of decentralization of functions in the hope that local gov-
ernments will use their autonomy to address access and quality problems in basic education 
rather than on the basis of assessment of which level is more appropriate for assuming the 
responsibility. While centralization was critical in meeting the need to quantitatively expand 
the system during the American occupation and after the Second World War, coordination of 
public service provision did not keep up with the rapid expansion of the education system, par-
ticularly in rural areas (Zamora, 1967). Because of these constraints, political decentralization 
has long been identified as a suitable structure to better achieve the qualitative objectives of 
education (Swanson, 1960; UNESCO, 1949). Schools were progressively granted some degree 
of autonomy, formalized only through the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, which 
assigned functions to each level of education bureaucracy from the national level to the school 
level. 
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However, different levels of local government have been allocated functions regardless of their 
capacity or incentive to perform the assigned functions. Schools’ for example’ struggled with 
the newly conferred financial responsibilities entailed in allocating, spending and liquidating 
operational expenses, a core principle of School Based Management (SBM). Subsequent recen-
tralization of control over school improvement funds indicates an allocation of roles based on 
faith rather than actual capacity. Local governments were also brought in to provide local fi-
nancing to school operations but the special education fund utilization remained very limited, 
owing to a faulty budgeting process that is both at the mercy of national and local governments 
(Manasan et al., 2011). 
The process of decentralization has also been hijacked by existing officials, leading to sub-op-
timal allocation of functions. Despite the percolation of political decentralization of education 
into the earlier organizational forms, the decentralization that eventually occurred was what 
Brillantes (1987) called a ‘department model’ of administrative decentralization. Policy legacy 
would have guaranteed the devolution of education to the local governments, but backroom 
negotiations by the education bureaucracy resulted in the exemption of education from de-
centralization (Diokno, 2008). Regional and division offices that are at the mercy of a rigid 
national budgeting process continue to dominate the process of making decisions that clearly 
affect school management (De Guzman, 2007). As a former DepEd senior official lamented, 
“[r]egional offices…continue to try to control situations making operational decisions that are 
best left to school divisions” (Luz, 2009, p. 12).
Designing Policy Tools 
The lack of acumen in designing and deploying is evident in DepEd’s inability to move away 
from the traditional command and control tools to use more nimble newer tools for promoting 
accountability and performance. The criticisms over DepEd’s ‘culture of obeisance’ (Bautista, 
Bernardo, & Ocampo, 2009), the ‘no memo, no action attitude’ (Monsod, 2009) and the gov-
ernance by ‘DepEd memo’ (Luz, 2009) point to the very top-down and heavy-handed approach 
in getting things done within the education organization. As a result, most of DepEd’s policies 
have excessively focused on easily measured and controlled activities (Monsod, 2009) as the 
central office is heavily engaged in directing and guiding the day-to-day affairs of regional and 
division offices. Such a culture only perpetuates the slow and incremental transformation of 
reforms into results. 
Even the introduction of market-based policy instruments by DepEd has been constrained 
by this culture of obeisance. The education service contracting (ESC) scheme, one of the larg-
est public-private partnership programs in the world ( Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Guáqueta, 
2009), was introduced to democratize and improve access to quality education for ‘poor but de-
serving’ high school students by providing grants to students to attend private high schools to 
shift them away from congested public high schools. Recent evaluation studies of the scheme 
have demonstrated the failure of the scheme to decongest the public secondary school system 
and provide greater access to needy students  (Philippine Comission on Audit, 2018). The ESC 
failed to properly align the grants or slots with the distribution of ‘aisle students’ (or those 
students in excess of the current capacity of schools) (World Bank, 2011).  The main source of 
the setbacks is the inability of DepEd to construct an institutional arrangement that aligns the 
interests of the private administrator of ESC (i.e. the Private Education Assistance Commit-
tee/PEAC) and the equity objective of the scheme. As pointed out by the World Bank (2011), 
DepEd exercises almost no supervision over PEAC and is indeed subject to regulatory capture 
by it. Despite DepEd’s willingness to employ market-based instruments, its lack of capacity to 
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design appropriate policy tools and over-all proclivity for control mechanisms have contrib-
uted to the failure of the ESC.
Managing Financial and Human Resources
Despite efforts to guarantee sufficiently available resources, managing the largest bureaucracy 
in the country is not easy, particularly when it comes to expending financial resources and al-
locating personnel properly. For many years, DepEd has been unable to use its resources opti-
mally, having a consistently low utilization of the budget at year-end. From 2012-2016, average 
year-end budget utilization rate1 was only 73%, with the lowest rate recorded in 2013 (57%). 
According to current and former DepEd officials, much of the underspending is a result of the 
inability to carry out planned procurements and failure to liquidate expenses at the field level. 
In 2016, the external audit reports showed gaps in program planning and implementation, 
particularly in procurement and sub-allotment of the Central Office to the Regional Office, 
eventually leading to non-utilization of the budget and budget reversals. 
Chronic underspending is also evident in the schools. In 2008, a total of Php135 millions of 
school improvement funds were not downloaded to schools despite the thrust to automatically 
and directly transfers to field offices. The Philippine Commission on Audit report identified 
the failure of schools to prepare simple administrative documents like a School Improvement 
Plan and Work Program and financial reports as the primary reasons for the lack of download-
ing, indicative of many schools’ unpreparedness to properly disburse funds. Many of the cash 
advances taken by division offices remained unliquidated or unutilized owing to the lack of 
training on how to correctly manage and record financial accountabilities. 
Much of this inability to manage resources emanates from a lack of qualified managers at the 
different levels of the government. Appropriate supervision of schools is also largely absent 
owing to an insufficient number of division superintendents, with only 61% of divisions led 
by a duly-appointed superintendent in 2016, down from 80% in 2009. The absence of division 
leadership has prevented the highly centralized structure from providing technical assistance 
and advice to its delivery units. The career system has also failed to generate adequately trained 
school administrators since school leadership is usually given as a token of seniority and not 
based on managerial potential (Luz, 2009). Only 65% of elementary schools had either a prin-
cipal or school head in 2016 (DepEd 2017). With all these issues considered, why SBM failed 
is unsurprising. 
Ensuring Accountability
Until recently, there was no clear mechanism to hold the education department accountable 
for underperformance. DepEd adopted the Quality Assurance and Accountability Framework 
(QAAF) in 2010, defining accountability as vertical alignment of roles and responsibilities and 
allocation of principal accountability for certain education outcomes across different levels of 
the organization. However, implementation remains patchy, and as Ogundele and Laguador 
(2017) argue, proper assessment and evaluation can only be made after the implementation 
and roll-out of the quality assurance system. Recent government-wide reforms on improving 
performance management attempt to establish accountability through a single results-based 
performance management system (RBPMS), linked with a bonus system based on the perfor-
mance of delivery units. A survey of perceptions of civil servants revealed that better manage-
ment, trust and teamwork in DepEd as well as positive effects on teacher recruitment are the 
key results of the RBPMS (World Bank, 2014). 
1 — Utilization rate is defined as total disbursement over total obligations.
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Driving accountability is challenging because of the situation of extreme scarcity of resources 
faced by different actors in the organization, particularly schools. Under the QAAF, schools 
serve as the core unit of quality assurance as they deliver the curriculum and instructions, 
teaching and facilitation, administration and leadership, learning environment and culture, 
while school performance is evaluated based on student achievement scores, dropout rates, 
the liquidation rate of maintaining expenses, and the achievement of other exemplary indica-
tors such as demonstrating initiative and uniqueness under the RBPMS. However, there is 
widespread opposition to the performance management from the teacher’s union because 
many teachers and principals see the lack of resources as a failure of the central government 
to provide support. School performance is thus perceived to be beyond the control of teachers 
(Torneo, 2016). 
More importantly, the lack of trust in performance information exacerbates the performance 
paradox in basic education due to deep-seated corruption in DepEd (Reyes Jr, 2007; Reyes, 
2009). In 2001, instances of cheating and selling of exams plagued standardized achievement 
exams, which led to the cancellation of the National Achievement Test (NAT). While the exam 
has since been reinstated, the same issues arose when an investigation by the National Bureau 
of Investigation revealed widespread cheating in 2011. More recent attempts to improve the 
integrity of information from DepEd involve systematization of data collection and manage-
ment through database systems—the Enhanced Basic Education Information System (EBEIS) 
and the Learner Information System (LIS)—that primarily provide data and information on 
schools and learners. The EBEIS covers indicators of input performance such as number of 
teachers and number of schools, while the LIS uniquely identifies all learners in the educa-
tion system, including information on gender, and name of guardian, among others. The LIS 
is envisioned to include information on achievement results and other performance data.  The 
installation of the EBEIS has eventually led to the calculation of public school capacity and 
determination of aisle students that can be targeted for ESC (World Bank, 2011).
Designing Appropriate Curriculum
The education research generated within DepEd has no doubt directed reforms towards cur-
ricular issues; however, while most curriculum issues are known, the implementation of re-
forms has been dismal. Various educational assessments commissioned by the government 
have touched on broad issues to include sector governance, but curriculum improvements have 
been at the center of most reforms. As noted by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
(1999), curriculum design improvements that had been introduced earlier, such as reduction in 
subjects and reduction of contact hours, provision of inputs and re-design of implementation 
structure, continued to lag. In fact, much of the design issues, such as overcrowding of topics 
and overlapping and duplication of contents (Mariñas & Ditapat, 1999), have been addressed 
and implemented on a larger scale only recently through the K-12 reform. The principle in 
curriculum design followed by the reformers was to ensure integrated and seamless learning, 
whereby lessons are horizontally articulated across subjects (Alonzo, 2015). These are thought 
to be the appropriate curriculum designs considering the initial problems faced by the dis-
juncture in instruction and curriculum between primary and secondary education due to a 
disjointed organizational structure. 
One reform where DepEd has shown analytical capacity to design appropriate curriculum is 
the institutionalization of kindergartens and the introduction of mother-tongue based edu-
cation. The Kindergarten Act of 2012 (otherwise known as Republic Act No. 10157) institu-
tionalizes pre-elementary schooling as the first phase of mandatory and compulsory formal 
172 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  2 :2
education, which is a response to years of research linking dropout rates, grade repetition and 
poor achievement rates to inadequate preparation for elementary education (Magno, 2010). 
The existing pre-elementary programs were so lacking in quality that, as the former DepEd 
Secretary Jesli Lapus noted, students need to “‘un-learn’ some of the things they were taught 
during their preschool year” (Lapus, 2008). The law also institutionalizes the adoption of a 
Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE), whereby the mother tongue of a 
child shall be used as the primary medium of instruction in classrooms. This came as a result of 
various studies employed by DepEd to distill best practices from other countries in improving 
the curriculum.
Conclusion
Over the last few decades, education systems around the world have been the subject of in-
cessant reforms – centred on curriculum, teacher training, budget mobilization, SBM, decen-
tralization, and so on – with varying but largely lacklustre results. In retrospect, the outcomes 
are unsurprising given that the reforms have focused on specific problematic issues without 
considering the relationships among them. More significantly, without a comprehensive con-
ception of the sector and the requirements for its effective functioning, the reforms have been 
either partial or misdirected. This paper sought to overcome the lacunae in both scholarship 
and practice by proposing a composite framework identifying the key political and operational 
functions in the management of the sector and assessing the extent to which they are per-
formed. From this perspective, education policy is fundamentally about establishing a govern-
ance structure to ensure that all political and operational functions necessary to achieve the 
chosen policy goals are performed.
Application of the framework to the case of the Philippines showed that while the reforms cor-
rectly identified and hit some of the targets, they overlooked, neglected or mishandled many 
more. The government’s overwhelming focus on fiscal mobilization and, especially, decentrali-
zation, blindsided it to other vital governance functions. More crucially, the government has 
been unclear about education policy goals and how to achieve them. Resource mobilization 
and decentralization measures in the absence of goal clarity understandably produced only 
limited success. Similarly, political support for education did not realize its full potential due to 
an absence of clear operational objectives. The problem was compounded by lack of attention 
to analytical and operational functions that need to be attended to if the sector is to function 
effectively. 
While decentralization and SBM reforms have provided much needed relief from the rigidities 
and unnecessary centralization of the past, they have had only limited impact due to shortcom-
ings along other dimensions of governance. These unremarkable outcomes are hardly surpris-
ing given that neither decentralization nor SBM directly address many of the core governance 
deficiencies in the sector. It is hoped that further research along the lines proposed in this 
paper will encourage scholars and policymakers to focus more on strengthening governance of 
the education sector.
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